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National authorities are presently not willing to install a supranational authority
vested with the competencies required to internalize global environmental external-
ities. Therefore we adopt a dynamic framework of two economies (i.e. Europe and
rest of world) and analyze their strategic interactions in the presence of interna-
tional knowledge spillovers and international environmental externalities — both are
empirically signiﬁcant. Starting from noncooperation we investigate the eﬀects of
environmental cooperation, knowledge cooperation and full cooperation. We ar-
gue that because of international patent markets, knowledge spillovers are already
internalized to a huge extent. For the output-induced pollution speciﬁcation we
found that the existence of international patent markets is partly responsible for
the present environmental degradation. Therefore it is uncertain whether the cre-
ation of patent markets in the past — though stimulating growth — increased welfare.
However, for the capital-induced pollution speciﬁcation, internalizing the knowledge
spillovers goes hand in hand with a better environmental quality.
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The fact that many environmental problems, as for example acidiﬁcation or pollution of
rivers and lakes, are international rather than national in nature implies that environmen-
tal externalities will not be fully internalized by means of national tax policies. Many of
the most pressing environmental problems, such as the anthropogenic greenhouse eﬀect
or the destruction of the ozone layer, even possess a global character.1 Just by assuming
a supranational authority vested with the required competencies — for example, to intro-
duce global environmental taxes — models of closed economies could be used to analyze
the eﬀects of a global environmental policy on growth and welfare. Then the world econ-
omy could be interpreted as a closed economy. However, this assumption is unrealistic.
For the time being national governments are not willing to install supranational author-
ities vested with the required competencies to internalize global externalities. It is thus
surprising that the investigation of international or global environmental externalities are
rarely analyzed in open dynamic frameworks.
In addition to international environmental spillovers there may exist other non-environ-
mental transboundary externalities. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that foreign cu-
mulative R&D is an important determinant of domestic productivity. For example, Coe
and Helpman (1995) ﬁnd by using pooled time-series/cross-section data of 21 OECD
countries plus Israel during the period 1971-90 that foreign R&D capital stock has im-
portant eﬀects on the total domestic factor productivity, and these are stronger the more
open an economy is to foreign trade. Cumulative R&D expenditure is here used as a
proxy for the stock of knowledge. The beneﬁts from foreign R&D, for instance, consist
of learning about new technologies and materials, production processes, or organizational
methods. As R&D capital is a speciﬁc form of human capital associated with innovation,
Engelbrecht (1997) additionally distinguishes between R&D and ‘general’ human capital,
measured as average years of schooling of the labor force. His study supports the statisti-
cally signiﬁcant results of Coe and Helpman and ﬁnds the same eﬀects for general human
capital.
The above mentioned observations lead us to study the strategic interactions between
two countries (for instance Europe and the rest of world) within the framework of a dif-
ferential game and to answer the question how pollution, economic growth and welfare
are inﬂuenced by diﬀerent international policy coordinations. Therefore we develop a
model by considering international knowledge and international environmental spillovers
in a framework with Uzawa—Lucas production processes. We assume that every coun-
1For surveys on international environmental problems, see Mäler (1990) or Sandler (1997).
2try is mutually aﬀected by negative international environmental spillovers generated by
the production process and by positive international knowledge spillovers associated with
the accumulation of human capital. The welfare of the representative agent in every
country is negatively aﬀected by environmental pollution of the domestic and the foreign
countries, whereas the accumulation of human capital is an increasing function of the
domestic human-capital stock and of foreign human-capital spillovers. Households invest
in the stock of knowledge which has the character of an international public good in the
absence of international patent markets. For simplicity, we assume two identical coun-
tries, implying that international trade and capital ﬂo w sa r ea b s e n t .W ed e r i v eb o t ht h e
noncooperative open-loop Cournot—Nash equilibrium where countries are assumed not to
take into account the eﬀects of their actions on the other country and the full cooperative
outcome, corresponding to supranational planning. Starting from noncooperation we are
thus able to investigate the eﬀects of environmental cooperation, knowledge cooperation
and full cooperation.
We now brieﬂy review the literature on environmental policy in open endogenously
growing economies. The analysis of environmental policy in open endogenously growing
economies has been largely ignored in the literature. Exceptions are van der Ploeg and
Ligthart (1994), Elbasha and Roe (1996), Bretschger (1998a) and Hettich and Svane (1998).
Elbasha and Roe (1996) ﬁnd for a small open endogenously growing economy where
growth is driven by innovation that long-run growth rises with a country’s endowment
in primary factors, with the degree of openness and with the degree of market power of
patent holders. Furthermore, the eﬀe c t so fe n v i r o n m e n t a lp o l i c yo ng r o w t hd e p e n do n
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In a north/south model with two diﬀerent
assumptions on the dislocation of ﬁrms from the north to the south Bretschger (1998)
analyses the eﬀects of a tighter environmental policy in the north. By using a model where
growth is endogenously driven by innovation he shows that although pollution may rise in
the south, the global environmental quality improves. However, the positive environmen-
tal eﬀect is accompanied by a lower economic growth rate. Hettich and Svane (1998) show
that the possibilities of a small open economy to pursue an independent environmental
policy depend upon the tax system. Under a residence-based income tax system which
discriminates between domestic source and foreign source income it is possible to pursue
an independent environmental policy thereby determining the own growth rate. Under a
source-based tax system, where the after-tax interest rate should equal the world interest
rate, the government can no longer pursue an own ﬁrst best environmental policy since
the interest rate is given.
This present paper was inspired by the contribution of van der Ploeg and Ligth-
3art (1994). They analyze the strategic interaction between two identical countries in an
endogenous growth model and take into account three international spillovers: knowledge
spillovers, externalities resulting from government spending on a productive public good
and environmental externalities. In their one-sector growth model growth is driven by
infrastructure.2 To a certain degree we adopt their approach, however we assume a diﬀer-
ent production technology. Using the two-sector Uzawa—Lucas model — with a separate
education sector — allows us to distinguish explicitly between human capital and physical
capital and thus provides a better possibility for modeling knowledge spillovers. We shall
see that allowing for substitution between physical and human capital in the production
process changes the eﬀects of cooperation substantially. Furthermore, in contrast to their
contribution, we shall see that certain results of cooperation depend on whether physical
capital or ﬁnal good production is responsible for pollution.
The results of the paper are the following: We argue that because of international
patent markets, knowledge spillovers are already internalized to a huge extent, i.e. knowl-
edge cooperation describes best the real world in our model. For the output-induced
pollution speciﬁcation we ﬁnd that the existence of international patent markets is partly
responsible for the present environmental degradation. Therefore it is uncertain whether
the creation of patent markets in the past — though stimulating growth — increases wel-
fare. However, for the capital-induced pollution speciﬁcation, internalizing the knowledge
spillovers goes hand in hand with a better environmental quality. Independent of the pol-
lution speciﬁcation we ﬁnd that a pollution cooperation lowers environmental degradation,
increases welfare while leaving the growth rate unaﬀected.
In the following, we ﬁrst describe in Section 2 the setup for the two-country economy.
As the eﬀects of cooperation depend on the pollution speciﬁcation, in Section 3 we choose
physical capital as the polluting factor and in Section 4 ﬁnal output as the polluting
factor. In order to determine the cooperation eﬀe c t s ,w ed e r i v ei nb o t hs e c t i o n st h e
noncooperative open-loop Cournot—Nash equilibrium and the cooperative outcome which
would result under supranational planning. By comparing the reduced forms we can
assess the eﬀects of cooperation on growth, pollution and welfare. Section 5 summarizes
the results and concludes.
2. The Analytical Framework
We analyze the strategic interactions between two countries. Every country is mutually
aﬀected by positive international knowledge spillovers associated with human capital accu-
2It is a Barro type of model, that is, with a productive public good.
4mulation and negative international environmental spillovers generated by the production
process. We derive both the noncooperative open-loop Cournot—Nash equilibrium where
countries are assumed not to take into account the eﬀects of their actions on the other
country and the full cooperative outcome, corresponding to supranational planning i.e. a
global ﬁrst-best solution. We are thus able to analyze the eﬀects of knowledge cooperation,
pollution cooperation and full cooperation. The open-loop Nash solution assumes that
players have only initial state information and that the period of commitment is equal
to the entire planning horizon. Every country is represented by a national benevolent
central planner. Therefore, countries are treated as unit actors and the internal national
decision-making process is ignored.
The underlying assumptions imply that important aspects of international environ-
mental cooperations are ignored. Assuming that the period of commitment is equal to
the entire planning horizon implies that stability problems are ruled out. Since we con-
sider only two countries, cooperative equilibria with only a subgroup of countries partic-
ipating are not possible either.3 Finally, due to the assumption of identical countries all
environmental agreements are cost eﬃcient.4 Nevertheless, we analyze not only the nonco-
operative and the full cooperative solutions, but also partial environmental or knowledge
cooperations.
We consider a global economy consisting of two identical countries, the home country
and the foreign country, the latter being indicated by an asterisk ‘∗’. Every economy is
described by a two sector endogenous growth model. The production structure is based
on the Uzawa—Lucas model extended by an international human capital spillover and
an international environmental externality. The ﬁrst sector produces a perfect malleable
output good while in the second sector human capital is accumulated. Since the countries
are identical, we in the following describe the economy only from the domestic perspective.
In the ﬁrst sector, the ﬁnal good Y is produced with a Cobb—Douglas technology
that possesses constant returns to scale with respect to physical capital K and eﬀective





where A,H,K,Y > 0,0 < α < 1 and 0 6 u 6 1.E ﬀective labor is deﬁned as the
3See, for example, Barrett (1994) for the issues of stability and coalition size of international environ-
mental agreements in static and dynamic games of identical countries. For agreements of subcoalitions
including side payments between identical countries, see Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), and between
heterogeneous countries, see Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1996).
4For the problems of cost-eﬀectiveness in international environmental agreements, see Hoel (1993) and
Schmidt (2000) in static, and Kverndokk (1993) in dynamic frameworks.
5product of u — the fraction of the unit time budget that is devoted to production of the
ﬁnal good — and human capital H. Parameters α and 1 − α are the exogenous shares
of physical capital and eﬀective labor, respectively, and A reﬂects the exogenously given
level of the technology. Both inputs H and K can be accumulated inﬁnitively. Therefore,
falling marginal products to one factor can be avoided and unlimited growth is in principle
possible. The ﬂow resource constraint of the economy is given by:5
Yt = Ct + ˙ Kt + Zt + δKKt. (2.2)
where C,Z,δK > 0. Final output Y can be used either for consumption C,f o rn e t
investment in the physical capital stock ˙ K, for private abatement activities Z, or to
prevent the current physical capital stock from depreciation δKK.
In the education sector, human capital is accumulated with a constant returns to scale
technology which utilizes human capital whereas physical capital is negligible:










where B,H,δH > 0. Parameter B is the studying productivity, (1 − u) is the fraction
of the unit time budget devoted to education (0 6 u 6 1), δH is the depreciation rate of
human capital and 0 < β < 1 is the exogenous domestic human capital share in education.
New human capital is accumulated by using time and old human capital. However, it is
produced not only by using domestic human capital (ﬁrst bracket on the rhs) but also
by using foreign human capital (second bracket on the rhs), which is indicated by an
asterisk ‘∗’. The latter is exogenous for the home country and reﬂects the international
human capital spillover.
The utility function of the domestic country depends on the trade-oﬀ between con-
















lnC − ηPP, for ε =1 . (2.5)
Utility is seen to be increasing in consumption at a decreasing rate, UC > 0,U CC < 0,
while it is decreasing in aggregate pollution UP < 0. Utility is decreasing in aggregate
5A variable with a dot denotes the derivative with respect to time while a variable with a hat stands
for its growth rate.
6pollution at an increasing rate UPP > 0, at a constant rate UPP =0 , or at a decreasing
rate UPP < 0 for ε larger than, equal to, or smaller than ηP/(1 + ηP).T h e p o s i t i v e
parameter ηP represents the weight of pollution in utility.6
Pollution generated by the home country p, and pollution caused by the foreign coun-
try
∗
p, contribute to total pollution P. Thus global pollution is a weighted sum of national
and foreign pollution:
Pt = pt +( 1− ηF)
∗
pt, (2.6)
where 0 ≤ ηF ≤ 1. By means of parameter ηF we can distinguish diﬀerent kinds of
externalities. In the case of a global externality such as the anthropogenic greenhouse
eﬀect it does not matter where pollution is generated and total pollution is the sum
of national and foreign pollutions (P = p+
∗
p), obtained by setting parameter ηF =0 .
However, in the case of acid rain, transboundary pollution depends on the strength and
direction of the wind. In the model this can be illustrated by setting ηF somewhere
between zero and unity. Finally, setting ηF =1reﬂe c t st h ec a s eo fap u r en a t i o n a l
externality such as noise or smog.
We analyze two plausible pollution speciﬁcations: Pollution is either generated by
the use of physical capital in production or by production itself as a side product. The
externality is assumed to aﬀect individuals’ utility negatively, but does not harm the
production process, that is, there are no positive spillovers of a better environment to
the production of goods. Following the literature, pollution p can be reduced by means
of abatement activities Z, w h i c hi nt u r nc o n s u m eap a r to fo u t p u t ,i nl i n ew i t ht h eﬂow













where χ is the exogenous elasticity of P with respect to ratios K/Z or Y/Z.T h u s ,g i v e n
a certain stock of physical capital or a certain level of output, pollution can be reduced
by raising the level of abatement activities.
3. Physical Capital as the Polluting Factor
In this section we assume that pollution is caused by using physical capital in production
and can be reduced by abatement activities, see eq. (2.7). For this pollution speciﬁcation
6U0 represents the present value of the future instantaneous utility levels, and parameter ρ is the rate
of time preference, which is assumed to be strictly positive.
7we derive in the following the noncooperative solution, the cooperative solution and ﬁnally
the cooperation eﬀects on core variables.
3.1. The Noncooperative Solution
The strategic interactions over time between the two countries are modeled as a diﬀer-
ential game. For the noncooperative solution the symmetrical countries are assumed to
behave in a Cournot—Nash manner: given the selected plan of the foreign government the
benevolent planner of the home country maximizes lifetime utility (2.4) of the represen-
tative citizen by choosing the time paths of domestic consumption, abatement activities,
physical and human capital accumulation, and the fraction of time devoted to produc-
tion subject to the domestic resource constraint (2.2) and the human capital accumulation
constraint (2.3). Since countries are assumed to be identical, no trade will occur in equilib-
rium and international ﬂows of commodities or capital can be ignored. The current-value






































p are exogenously given for the domestic country
reﬂecting the international knowledge and pollution spillovers from the foreign country,
respectively.


























































For the foreign central planner variables (1 − u)H and p are exogenously given. Since
the two countries are identical it is suﬃcient to derive the ﬁrst-order conditions for one
country. Due to the assumed symmetry of the countries, the ﬁrst-order conditions of
the home and the foreign countries are equivalent. Thus, it is suﬃcient to derive the
ﬁrst-order conditions for one country. Furthermore, the domestic variables solving the


















In addition, along a balanced growth path the variables C, H, K, YZgrow at the same
constant rate g,w h e r e a su is constant over time:
g ≡ ˆ C = ˆ H = ˆ K = ˆ Y = ˆ Z, 0=˙ u. (3.3)
Because of condition (3.3), the ratios C/K, Z/K, K/H, Y/K and Y/Z are constant, and
therefore pollution P is constant along a balanced growth path as well. A constant level
of P is in accordance with sustainable development if the ecosystem is assumed to be a
renewable resource and the level of pollution does not exceed the its absorbtion capacity.
Using conditions (3.2) and (3.3), the ﬁrst-order conditions along a balanced growth

















− δK − ρ
¶
, (3.5)











g = B (1 − u) − δH. (3.8)
Eq. (3.4) requires that the marginal utility of consumption and abatement must be equal-
ized. Eq. (3.5) represent the Keynes—Ramsey rule. According to it the economy grows,
remains constant, or declines if the return to physical capital α Y
K corrected by the marginal
damage of pollution Z
K is larger than, equal to, or smaller than the sum of the rate of
physical capital depreciation and the rate of time preference. Eq. (3.6) represents the
second Euler condition. It says that the economy grows, remains constant or declines if
the marginal product of human capital in the education sector βB is larger than equal to,
or smaller the sum of the rate of human capital depreciation and the rate of time prefer-
ence. Eq. (3.7) is the ﬂow resource constraint of the economy and eq. (3.8) is the human
capital accumulation constraint. Eq. (3.6) is already the reduced form of g. The other
reduced forms of the time devoted to production u, the consumption-capital ratio C
K,t h e
9output-capital ratio Y
K and the abatement-capital ratio Z
K can be derived immediately by
using the ﬁrst-order conditions (3.4)—(3.8):
u =






(1 − αε)(βB − δH − ρ)+( 1− α)δK + ρ







(1 − ε)(βB − δH − ρ)+
2−ηF













To identify the eﬀects of cooperation we compare the reduced forms of the noncooperative
solution with the reduced forms of the cooperative solution which we shall derive in the
following.
3.2. The Cooperative Solution
In the cooperative solution each national social planner takes into account the eﬀects of
their decisions on the other country, hence all international spillovers are internalized.
The easiest way to derive the global optimum is to assume a supranational social planner.






u in order to maximize the sum of lifetime
welfare in both countries subject to the national resource and human capital accumulation





















































































After eliminating the shadow prices and imposing the symmetry condition (3.2) the ﬁrst-















− δK − ρ
¶
, (3.15)











g = B (1 − u) − δH. (3.18)
Comparing eq. (3.4) with (3.14) and (3.6) with (3.16), we see that the marginal utility of
abatement and the marginal product of human capital are increased in the cooperative
solution, respectively — remember that 0 6 ηF 6 1 and 0 < β 6 1. This policy corresponds
to a positive shock in consumers’ preferences for environmental quality ηP and in the
studying productivity parameter B of education sector. In the noncooperative solution
the national central planner does not take into account the international environmental
spillovers, that is, that domestic pollution creates a disutility in the foreign country as
well. Therefore, the marginal utility of abatement is too low from a global welfare point
of view. Furthermore, in the noncooperative solution the central planner does not take
into account the beneﬁcial eﬀects of domestic human capital accumulation for the foreign
country. Hence, in the noncooperative solution the return to human capital is too low
from a global welfare point of view.
Eq. (3.16) is already the reduced form of the growth rate. By using eqs. (3.14)—(3.18)
we can derive the reduced forms of u, C/K, Y/K K/Z:
u =






(1 − αε)(B − δH − ρ)+( 1− α)δK + ρ





(1 − ε)(B − δH − ρ)+ 1
χηP (B − δH + δK)+ρ






α − 1+ α
ηPχ
(1 − αε)(B − δH − ρ)+( 1− α)δK + ρ
. (3.22)
After having calculated the noncooperative and the cooperative outcomes we are able now
to determine the cooperation eﬀects on growth, pollution and welfare.
113.3. Cooperation Eﬀects on Growth, Pollution and Welfare
We now can distinguish three diﬀerent scenarios of cooperation: knowledge cooperation,
environmental cooperation and full cooperation. The latter is the globally ﬁrst-best solu-
tion described above. What are the reasons for analyzing partial cooperations? First, it
is likely that the negotiation costs diﬀer between the two international spillovers. Second,
the public is well informed about one spillover but not about the other because there is less
uncertainty about it, or the consequences are more visible. In the extreme, the countries
do not know about the second spillover.7 Finally, partial cooperations are advantageous
from a technical point of view since it is easier to show isolated cooperation eﬀects of one
spillover.
To assess the eﬀects of the three diﬀerent cooperative solutions on growth, pollution
and welfare we compare the reduced forms of the noncooperative solution (3.6) and (3.9)—
(3.12) with the corresponding reduced forms of the cooperative solution (3.16) and (3.19)—
(3.22). We see that the noncooperative solution is identical to the full cooperative solution
if international spillovers are absent (β =1and ηF =1 ) .
There are two possibilities for computing the eﬀects of the diﬀerent cooperative out-
comes. (i) The eﬀects of knowledge cooperation on core variables are similar to the eﬀects
of a higher β in the reduced forms of the noncooperative outcome. The eﬀects of envi-
ronmental cooperation on core variables are similar to the eﬀects of a higher ηF in the
reduced forms of the noncooperative solution. Finally, the eﬀects of full cooperation on
core variables are similar to the eﬀects of a simultaneous increase of β and ηF in the
reduced forms of the noncooperative outcome. Unfortunately, the partial derivatives of
the reduced forms with respect to a simultaneous increase of β and ηF are impossible to
obtain. (ii) The other possibility to ﬁgure out the eﬀects on core variables for a full coop-
eration is to compare the reduced forms of the noncooperative solution with the reduced
forms of the cooperative solution. For the partial cooperations this is done as follows. We
can mimic the cooperative outcome for the separate knowledge and pollution agreements
by setting β =1and ηF =1in the reduced forms of the noncooperative solution, re-
spectively. For example, to derive the eﬀects of knowledge cooperation we compare every
reduced form of the noncooperative solution for 0 < β < 1 with itself, but setting β =1 .
By doing so we obtain the eﬀects of knowledge cooperation on pollution, growth and the
consumption-capital ratio. Similarly this can be done for the environmental cooperation
7International spillovers could aﬀect the countries asymmetrically, which complicates the negotiation
and the success of a full cooperation. However, since we assume identical countries, this is not possible
in our framework.
12as well. The eﬀects on growth, pollution and the consumption-capital ratio of knowledge,
environmental and full cooperation are summarized in Table 3.1 in rows 2-4. The su-
perscript ‘nc’ indicates the noncooperative solution whereas ‘c’ indicates the cooperative
outcome. In order to analyze welfare changes we integrate the discounted life-time utility





































ρ2g for ε =1 , (3.23)
where the term [ρ − g (1 − 1/ε)] must be positive to rule out explosive consumption
paths.8 From the present-value utility function (3.23) we see that the discounted lifetime
utility is a rising function of the consumption-capital ratio and the rate of growth but
a decreasing function of pollution. K0 represents the exogenous initial capital stock at
period 0. Inserting the results of Table 3.1 ( r o w s2 — 4 )i nf u n c t i o n( 3 . 2 3 )w ea r en o wa b l e
to analyze the diﬀerent agreements from a welfare point of view. The eﬀects on welfare
are summarized in row 5 of Table 3.1. Before we describe the cooperations eﬀects, recall
that in the noncooperative solution all existing national externalities are internalized as
we have assumed a national benevolent dictator.
knowledge cooperation pollution cooperation full cooperation
growth gnc <g c gnc = gc gnc <g c































Table 3.1:C o o p e r a t i o ne ﬀects on core variables, when P=f(K,Z)
Knowledge cooperation: The national governments internalize only the external in-
ternational eﬀect of human capital accumulation to the other country. Therefore, the
marginal product of studying increases, this boosts growth in the cooperative solution
since the education sector is the engine of growth.9 Due to the fact that the marginal pro-
ductivity of human capital increases, ﬁnal good production becomes more human capital
8This is shown, for example, by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 156). The requirement corresponds
to the bounded utility condition and rules out explosive consumption paths.
9A c c o r d i n gt ot h ec o n s t a n tr e t u r n st os c a l ei nt h eﬁnal good sector (2.1), both capital stocks have to
13intensive. This leads to a reduced pollution and an increased consumption-capital ra-
tio. Higher growth, a better environmental quality and an increased consumption-capital
share increase unambiguously welfare in the knowledge cooperation (see eq. (3.23)).
Environmental Cooperation: The governments internalize only the negative interna-
tional external eﬀect of pollution. The long-term growth rate is unchanged, pollution
decreases, and the consumption-capital ratio increases. The eﬀects on welfare in the case
of environmental cooperation are unambiguously positive.
Full cooperation: Since the eﬀects of the partial cooperations on core variables are the
same, it is not surprising that the full cooperation (which is a combination of the partial
cooperations) has the same eﬀects. Growth rises, environmental quality increases and the
consumption-capital ratio increases, which leads to a higher welfare.
4. Final Output as the Polluting Factor
In this section, pollution is assumed alternatively to be a function of total output Y and
abatement activities Z. So instead of assuming physical capital to be the dirty factor
responsible for generating a negative environmental externality, we now assume output
to be responsible for pollution (see eq. (2.8)).
4.1. The Noncooperative Solution
We will skip the maximization problem and the derivation of the ﬁrst-order conditions
since it is analogous to that of Section 3. Along a balanced growth path, the Keynes—











− δK − ρ
¸
, (4.1)
where all other ﬁrst-order conditions along a balanced growth path are identical to
eqs. (3.4) and (3.6)—(3.8). The same applies for the reduced forms of the growth rate
and the fraction of time devoted to production. They are identical to eqs. (3.6) and (3.9).
However, the reduced forms of the consumption-capital ratio, of the output-capital ratio




(1 − αε)(βB − δH − ρ)+( 1− α)δK + ρ
α
, (4.2)
grow with the same rate along a balanced growth path. However, the growth rate of human capital stock





Ψ1 (βB − δH + δK)+χηPα[(ε − 1)δK + ερ]
α(2 − ηF)
, (4.3)




(2 − ηF)(βB − δH + δK)
χηP [(1 − αε)(βB − δH − ρ)+( 1− α)δK + ρ]
. (4.4)
4.2. The Cooperative Solution
The Keynes—Ramsey rule of the cooperative solution along a balanced growth path is
identical to the one of the noncooperative solution (4.1); note, however, that the output-
capital ratio and the abatement-capital ratio are determined diﬀerently as we shall see
in the following. The other ﬁrst-order conditions are identical to eqs. (3.14) and (3.16)—
(3.18). The reduced forms of the growth rate and of the fraction of time devoted to
production are identical to (3.16) and (3.19), respectively. The remaining reduced forms










Ψ2 (B − δH + δK)+χηPα[ερ +( ε − 1)δK]
α
, (4.6)




B − δH + δK
ηPχ[(1 − αε)(B − δH − ρ)+( 1− α)δK + ρ]
. (4.7)
4.3. Cooperation Eﬀects on Growth, Pollution and Welfare
In the following we distinguish between the eﬀects of knowledge cooperation, environ-
mental cooperation and full cooperation. Comparing the reduced forms again we see that
the noncooperative solution is identical to the full cooperative solution for β =1and
ηF =1 . The cooperative outcome for the knowledge and environmental cooperations can
be mimicked by setting β =1and ηF =1in the reduced forms of the noncooperative so-
lution, respectively. The discounted present value of utility is identical to eq. (3.23). The
eﬀects on growth, pollution, the consumption-capital ratio and welfare are summarized
in Table 4.1.
Due to knowledge cooperation the marginal product of studying increases which boosts
growth in the cooperative solution since the education sector is the engine of growth. The
increased marginal productivity of human capital in the education sector leads to a more
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welfare ambiguous Unc <U c Unc <U c
Table 4.1:C o o p e r a t i o ne ﬀects on core variables, when P=f(Y,Z)
human capital-intensive ﬁnal good production and to an increased consumption-capital
ratio. Since ﬁnal good production increases — responsible for the environmental exter-
nality — pollution rises. The welfare eﬀects are ambiguous due to the trade-oﬀ between
growth and pollution. Higher growth and an increased consumption-capital ratio increase
welfare, whereas higher pollution decreases welfare ceteris paribus (see eq. (3.23)).
An environmental cooperation does not aﬀect the engine of growth. Therefore, the
long-term growth rate is unchanged. Pollution decreases but the consumption-capital
ratio is unchanged. The eﬀects on welfare in the case of environmental cooperation are
unambiguously positive.
Under full cooperation, growth rises and the capital-consumption ratio increases; how-
ever, the eﬀect on pollution is ambiguous. Depending on the relative strength of the two
international spillovers, pollution may rise in the case of full cooperation. Nevertheless,
welfare increases since full cooperation is equivalent to a ﬁrst-best solution.
Spillovers exist because of missing markets. Knowledge spillovers, for instance in the
form of new inventions, can be internalized by the creation of patent markets. Obviously
international knowledge spillovers require a supranational patent authority vested with
the required competencies to guard and to enforce international patent treaties. To a
large extent such organizations exist. For instance the ‘European Patent Oﬃce’ (EPO),
established in 1977, protects patents within 18 European countries. Furthermore, Euro-
pean patents are also granted on the basis of international applications ﬁled under the
‘Patent Cooperation Treaty’. The Patent Cooperation Treaty is one of the various multi-
lateral treaties dealing with the legal and administrative aspects of intellectual property
rights which are administrated by the intergovernmental ‘World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization’ (WIPO). State membership of WIPO was more than 170 in August 1998.10
In addition, the EPO possesses a trilateral cooperation with the ‘Japanese Patent Oﬃce’
10Data is taken from the oﬃcial web site of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(http://www.wipo.org/eng/main.htm).
16and the ‘United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce’ which cover 80 per cent of the world
patents.11 Given these facts it seems plausible to state that many international knowl-
edge spillovers are already internalized. However, apart from the Montreal Protocol on
the protection of the ozone layer (1986) no substantial international environmental coop-
eration has been implemented so far. Thus one can argue that knowledge cooperation best
describes the real world in our model. From our analysis with the output-induces pollu-
tion speciﬁcation it is seen that knowledge cooperation unambiguously boosts growth but
causes deterioration in the environmental quality. Thus our model suggests that among
other things the creation of international patent markets is responsible for environmental
degradation. Furthermore, the eﬀects on welfare of knowledge cooperation are ambiguous
and depend on parameter values. This is a typical second-best result: the correction of
one distortion in the presence of other distortions does not necessarily improve welfare
(see Lipsey and Lancaster 1956). Hence the internalization of the knowledge spillover by
means of an international patent market may decrease welfare. Finally we can state that
the presence of international patent markets may even increase the need for environmental
cooperation which would then unambiguously increase welfare.
5. Summary
In this paper we considered international knowledge spillovers and international envi-
ronmental externalities, and analyzed the strategic interactions between two identical
countries within the framework of a diﬀerential game. By doing so we have taken into
account the fact that many of the most pressing environmental externalities are interna-
tional rather than national in nature and no supranational authority exists vested with
the required competencies to internalize these externalities. Furthermore, we have taken
into consideration the eﬀects of international knowledge spillovers on total factor produc-
tivity, as empirical evidence suggests. Every country was mutually aﬀected from positive
international knowledge spillovers and negative international environmental externalities.
Starting from the noncooperative open-loop Cournot—Nash equilibrium we investigated
the eﬀects of environmental cooperation, knowledge cooperation and full cooperation.
We have seen that some results concerning pollution and welfare of certain cooper-
ations depend on the chosen pollution speciﬁcation. However, the results summarized
in Table 5.1 are independent of the assumed pollution causing factor: We showed that
environmental cooperation improves welfare unambiguously since pollution reduction is
11Data and information is taken from the oﬃcial web site of the European Patent Oﬃce
(http://www.european-patent-oﬃce.org).
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Table 5.1:C o o p e r a t i o ne ﬀects on core variables, independent of pollution speciﬁcation
possible without harming growth. However, the eﬀects of knowledge cooperation depend
on the chosen pollution function, that is, whether pollution is a side product of physical
capital or of ﬁnal good production. If output is responsible for pollution we found that
knowledge cooperation increases growth at the expense of environmental quality; hence
the eﬀects on welfare are ambiguous. Thus, our model suggests that among other things
the existence of international patent markets is partly responsible for the environmental
degradation nowadays. Therefore it is uncertain whether the creation of a patent market
in the past increased welfare. However, if pollution is assumed to be a function of phys-
ical capital, the pessimistic result changes to a positive one. By assuming this pollution
speciﬁcation, knowledge cooperation boosts not only growth but also reduces pollution
and increases welfare. If this pollution speciﬁcation describes best the real world in our
model, the creation of a patent market increased growth and at the same time increased
environmental quality. Obviously, both eﬀects raise welfare. Hence, whether the creation
of international patent markets tends to improve or tends to reduce environmental quality
depends on the pollution speciﬁcation. Why are the results concerning the environment
less optimistic in the case where pollution is a function of output? Given a certain level of
output and abatement, with this speciﬁcation there is no possibility of reducing pollution
by choosing a diﬀerent input ratio in ﬁnal good production. On the other hand if pollu-
tion is generated by physical capital, pollution can be reduced by a more labor-intensive
production without lowering output or increasing abatement activities. This missing sub-
stitution possibility in the former case is responsible for the diﬀerent eﬀects of cooperation
on the environmental quality. Finally, we compare the eﬀects of full cooperation for both
pollution speciﬁcations. Our model suggests that full cooperation increases growth un-
ambiguously independent of the pollution speciﬁcation. However, whereas environmental
quality increases if pollution is generated by physical capital, the eﬀect becomes ambigu-
ous and depends on the relative strength of both spillovers if pollution is generated by
output.
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